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Decentralized Bargaining: Its Problems 
and Direction in the Public 
Education Systems of Ontario 
and the Western Provinces 
J. Douglas Muîr 
This paper is directed to the bargaining structure issue 
and examines the problems and direction of decentralized 
bargaining in British Columbia, Alberta and Ontario. 
Introduction 
While concern may be expressed over the impact of some strikes, 
the Canadian public has generally accepted labour's right to bargain. 
Even the introduction of collective bargaining rights for fédéral public 
servants in 1967 was met with surprisingly little résistance. Yet the col-
lective bargaining activities of public schoU teachers continue to be a 
controversial and highly emotional area. Teachers in a number of provin-
ces hâve a difficult struggle to obtain what they feel is one of their 
démocratie rights - the right to participate in the détermination of their 
salaries. The development of any collective bargaining procédure has 
been strongly resisted by most school trustées on the basis that it is not 
only unprofessional but it also undermines the responsibilities clelegated 
to school trustées by the electorate. Some members of the public hâve 
been concerned that any System based upon a conflict relationship is 
incompatible with the educational goals of the schools. Other ratepayers 
hâve been opposed to collective bargaining because of the impact they 
daim it has upon the level of school taxes. 
Most students of collective bar-
gaining support the collective bar-
gaining procédure although some 
compare it to a tribal ritual which 
124 
MUIR, J. Douglas, Associate Pro-
fessor, Faculty of Business Adminis-
tration and Commerce, The Univer-
sity of Alberta, Edmonton. 
DECENTRALIZED BARGAINING : ITS PROBLEMS AND DIRECTION . . . 125 
has little impact upon the actual level of salaries. Despite the various claims 
and counterclaims, collective bargaining is the System used to détermine 
the level of teachers' salaries in ail provinces except Prince Edward Island 
and Newfoundland. 
Thus the question of whether or not teachers in Canada will bargain 
collectively with their employers has generally been resolved. There are, 
however, two major associated issues still outstanding - one is a « right's » 
issue and the other is a « structural » issue. The right's issue involves the 
teachers' right to use the strike and/or other coercive weapons. The 
structural issue involves the question of whether teacher bargaining is 
to be conducted at the local level ; at the zone or area level ; or at the 
provincial level. Thus this later issue involves the degree of centralization 
that should exist in the bargaining structure. This paper is directed to the 
bargaining structure issue and examines the problems and direction of 
decentralized bargaining in British Columbia, Alberta, and Ontario. 
Development of Decentralized Bargaining Structures 
The reason for the development of decentralized bargaining sctruc-
tures in Ontario and the Western provinces is primarily one of historical 
évolution. Teachers' occupational associations were formed in Ontario, 
British Columbia and Alberta immediately after World War 1 1 : Thèse 
occupational associations began as either loose affiliations of local 
teachers' association, as in British Columbia, or as a fairly centralized 
association, where teachers were affiliated directly to the provincial body 
rather than to the local association as in Alberta. Regardless of the 
organizational structure, however, the strength of the association initially 
lay in the locals of the association. As a resuit, some locals developed 
faster, became stronger and assumed more militancy than did others. 
Teachers in some locals strongly endorsed the associations' occupational 
objectives whereas those on others did not. Thus pressure for voluntary 
récognition of the local association as a bargaining représentative for 
teachers varied from one local to another. In addition school trustée 
résistance to this voluntary bargaining concept also varied between school 
jurisdictions. Hence throughout the 1920's and 1930's some local teachers 
« bargained » collectively with their local school boards whereas others 
dit not. Collective bargaining by teachers in Canada therefore originated 
1
 It should be noted that educational associations existed before this time but 
their membership was broad based and they were not directly concerned with 
teachers' économie or occupational problems. 
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and found its initial strength at the local level and therefore was initially 
decentralized. 
The weakness and inequity of the voluntary system of bargaining 
became quite évident to the teachers of British Columbia and Alberta 
during the 1930's. The teachers' associations in thèse two provinces there-
fore exerted considérable effort to obtain some form of bargaining rights. 
As a resuit of this pressure the British Columbia Education Act was 
revised in 1937 to provide compulsory arbitration of teachers' salary 
disputes and an implicit récognition of the teachers' right to bargain. 
Similarly thèse efforts in Alberta resulted in the teachers obtaining a 
statutory association membership requirement in 1936 and the statutory 
right to bargaining in 1941. (Teachers in Ontario hâve not sought and 
do not as yet actually hâve the right to bargain). The bargaining rights 
gained by teachers in Alberta and British Columbia were obtained on 
the basis of the then existing decentralized or local bargaining structure. 
Thus the évolution of voluntary bargaining into compulsory bargaining 
at the local level further developed decentralized bargaining structures 
which over the years hâve become quite strongjy institutionalized. 
Current Bargaining Situation 
As indicated, the teachers currently hâve the statutory « right » to 
bargain in British Columbia and Alberta but not in Ontario. The teachers 
in Ontario do not appear to need this right since a séries of « gentlemen's 
agreements » between the Ontario Teachers' Fédération and the Ontario 
School Trustées' Council hâve voluntarily granted thèse rights to Ontario 
teachers. Thèse gentlemen's agreements take the form of an exchange of 
letters between the Fédération and the Council which establishes the 
« common law » governing the relations between the parties. One of the 
first of thèse gentlemen's agreements established that negotiations would 
be conducted at the local level between the school trustées and the local 
teachers' association. Negotiations hâve been conducted at the local level 
in Ontario ever since. In British Columbia there has been little concern 
over the size of the bargaining unit and the practice has been that thèse 
units conform to the size of the local school jurisdiction. Thus the practice 
of local level bargaining is firmly established in British Columbia. Finally, 
although the Alberta Teachers' Association is the officiai bargaining agent, 
the bargaining units desired by the teachers and certified by the Alberta 
Board of Industrial Relations hâve ail been local in scope and conform to 
the size of the local school jurisdiction. Thus in ail three provinces bar-
gaining is decentralized, and negotiations are conducted at the local level 
between each school board and a committee of its local teachers. 
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Although the bargaining structure is decentralized, the provincial 
association in each of thèse three provinces hâve become heavily involved 
in the collective bargaining procédures. In British Columbia, initial salary 
négociations are conducted between a committee of the local teachers and 
a committee of the local school board. However, in ail instances where 
settlement is not reached at this local level, the central staff of the teachers* 
Fédération and the trustées' Association prépares and présents the briefs 
to the salary arbitration board. (Expérience has been that about 35 
percent of the salary disputes are resolved at this level). In Alberta ail 
negotiations commence at the local level between a committee of the 
teachers and a committee of the school board. However, the Alberta 
Board of Industrial Relations has ruled that, if settlement is not reached 
at this local level, the staff of the teachers' Association (the officiai 
« bargaining agent » ) must become involved before the dispute can be 
referred to a conciliation commissioner. As a resuit, the professional staff 
of the teachers, Association and of the trustées' Association take over and 
handle ail disputes that are referred to either a conciliation Commission 
or to a Conciliation Board. Thus the provincial associations become 
directly involved in about forty percent of the salary settlements in 
Alberta. The practice in Ontario is similar to that of the other two 
provinces. The majority of negotiations are conducted between com-
mittees of local teachers and local school boards. However, if difficulty 
is experienced, the local teachers and/or the local school board may 
refer the dispute to their respective provincial association. In this way 
the provincial associations become directly involved in about twenty 
percent of the salary settlements in Ontario2. It should be noted that, 
even when negotiations are conducted at the local level, the provincial 
associations in thèse provinces actively assist the local negotiations by 
(a) supplying them with statistics and other material to be used during 
negotiations, (b) coordinating local negotiations, (c) training local nego-
tiation committees, and (d) generally assisting and advising the local 
negotiators. 
It may therefore be concluded that, although the bargaining structure 
is decentralized in thèse three provinces, there is considérable control, 
coordination and direction provided by the professional staff of the 
2 It should be noted that it is not the Ontario Teachers' Fédération or the 
Ontario School Trustées' Council but it is the affiliâtes of thèse central bodies which 
become involved in thèse negotiations. For example, it might be the Ontario 
Secondary School Teachers' Fédération and the Northern Ontario Public and 
Secondary School Trustées' Association which would take over the negotiations. 
The OTF and the OSTC become involved only im a conciliatory rôle. 
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provincial teachers' and trustées' association. Thus while bargaining may 
be decentralized in structure it is not devoid of central influences. 
Reaction to the Decentralized Bargaining Structure 
Over the past décade the trustées' association hâve been steadily 
increasing their opposition to the existing decentralized bargaining struc-
tures. This opposition is greatest in Alberta and British Columbia but is 
also developing in Ontario. An indication of this development can be 
gained from looking at the Alberta expérience. Prior to the early 1960's 
there was little central coordination of school board bargaining activities. 
As the décade progressed so did the amount of central coordination of 
bargaining. This coordination has taken the form of (a) assisting local 
school boards at the conciliation stages, (b) supplying statistics and 
économie support arguments to local trustées, (c) conducting negotiation 
training sessions, (d) holding zone bargaining coordination meeting, (e) 
lobbying to hâve the Alberta Labour Act amended to allow zone bar-
gaining, (f ) using the same « barganing agent » to represent ail school 
boards in a zone (so that although negotiations were conducted locally a 
united front was put forward), and finally (g) attempting to force the 
teachers into zone bargaining. Although the pattern has been slightly 
différent in British Columbia the expérience has been similar. 
The school boards' opposition to decentralized bargaining has been 
based upon the argument that (a) it fits into the teacher's whipsawing 
tactics, (b) it forces inexperienced trustées to face the teachers' experienc-
ed bargainers, (c) it is extremely time consuming for part-time trustées, 
(d) it is deleterious to trustée-teacher relations and therefore detrimental 
to the educational System, and (e) the différences in the local conditions 
do not warrant local bargaining - particularly when virtually ail items 
bargained are monetary items. It should also be emphasized that the 
teachers in ail three provinces strongly support the existing decentralized 
bargaining structure and are resisting any move on the part of the trustées 
to centralize it. The teachers' case is based upon the arguments that (a) 
negotiations must be conducted between the local employer and its em-
ployées, (b) local negotiations provide an important point of com-
munications between trustées and teachers, (c) only through local nego-
tiations can local conditions be taken into account, and (d) they feel 
the existing System has worked effectively and there is no reason to change 
it. Thus at the présent time there is a struggle between thèse two groups 
over this issue, the resolution of which will be determined by the power 
relationship that exists. 
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Economie Significance of Decentràlized Bargaining 
One of the central points of différence between the trustées' position 
and the teachers' position concerning decentràlized bargaining is whether 
or not such bargaining takes local conditions into account. The trustées 
claim that it does not whereas the teachers insist that it does. Under a 
decentràlized negotiation System it may be hypothesized that, if local 
conditions vary between school jurisdictions and if thèse local conditions 
play an important rôle in the bargaining process, there will be a significant 
variation in the salary structures established in school jurisdictions through-
out a province. In order to test this hypothesis and to test the significance 
of thèse local conditions upon the salary scales, a detailed examination 
has been made of the salary scales paid by ail the school boards in British 
Columbia, Alberta and Ontario for the school years 1966-67 to 1969-70. 
Teachers' salaries are reported on a salary schedule or grid which 
establishes minimum and maximum salaries for each year of éducation 
and teachers automatically move from the minimum to the maximum 
salary with each additional year of teaching expérience. Tables I to IV 
report the average minimum and average maximum salaries paid for each 
qualification level for the years 1966-67 to 1969-70 in British Columbia, 
Alberta, and Ontario. Thèse tables also report the range in the salaries -
paid within each minimum and within each maximum salary for each 
qualification level - that is, the range between the lowest minimum salary 
paid and the highest minimum salary paid in a province to a teacher with, 
say, four years of éducation. In order to eliminate the influence of the 
old school board which may be paying an exceptionally high or low salary, 
the ranges between the lOth and the 90th percentiles for each minimum 
and maximum salary are also reported. Finally, in British Columbia and 
Alberta, where there are distinct districts or zones in the province, the 
salary ranges and percent increases for each minimum and maximum 
salary are also reported for each zone. In examining thèse tables little 
attention should be focused upon salaries for teachers at the first or 
lowest qualification level since in most instances thèse teachers are either 
being consciously eliminated or are being eliminated by attrition. 
An examination of Table I shows that the decentràlized bargaining 
structure in British Columbia has produced, 
(a) a range between the highest and the lowest salary paid within each 
minimum and maximum on the salary grid of approximately $1,000 
over the past three year period (an average of $875 in 1966, 
$1,005 in 1967, $919 in 1968 and $1,021 in 1969), 
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TABLE I (continued) 
MEANS & RANGES ABOUT THE MEANS IN BRITISH COLUMBIA FOR MINIMUM & MAXIMUM SALARIES 
PAID 1966 to 1969 
MINIMUM SALARIES MAXIMUM SALARIES 
EC EB EA PE PC PB PA PA(Mas) EC EB EA PE PC PB PA PA(Mas) 
Range of Salaries Within Each District (1969 oniy) 
East Kootenay 1413 475 110 175 200 325 840 312 312 — 160 210 231 — 
Fraser Valley 464 150 200 
— 
175 225 325 
— 
464 155 250 
— 
175 300 200 
— 
Mainline-Cariboo 825 225 200 
— 
225 225 200 
— 
825 200 200 
— 
225 225 200 
—. 
Metropolitan 213 85 90 
— 
80 101 242 
— 
820 224 225 
— 
226 299 181 
— 
North Coast 315 435 404 
— 
440 443 543 
— 
1080 473 535 
— 
595 881 709 
— 
Northern Interior 800 345 410 
— 
500 340 350 
— 
835 290 445 
— 
229 442 540 — • 
Okanagan 434 252 237 
— 
345 369 337 
— 
1104 452 540 
— 
520 454 585 
— 
South Coast 1270 260 410 
— 
525 410 410 
— 
1450 251 515 
— 
610 325 610 
— 
Vancouver Island 950 745 765 
— 
855 821 900 
— 
1745 990 965 
— 
995 860 1125 
— 
West Kootenay 1635 234 267 
— 
402 557 637 
— 
915 280 270 
— 
240 325 420 
— 
Percent Average Salary Jncreased 1968 to 1969 By District 
East Kootenay 3.2 5.4 6.0 — 5.8 6.5 6.2 — 10.7 6.4 6.5 — 5.9 6.1 6.4 — 
Fraser Valley 8.1 6.5 6.3 
— 
7.2 6.7 6.7 
— 
8.1 6.6 6.5 
— 
6.6 6.2 6.4 
— 
Mainline-Cariboo 10.6 6.7 7.1 
— 
6.7 7.0 5.7 
— 
9.0 6.3 6.6 
— 
6.5 6.8 6.3 
— 
Metropolitan 6.9 6.6 6.6 
— 
6.7 6.6 6.4 
— 
9.9 6.2 6.0 
— 
7.2 6.5 6.2 
— 
North Coast 5.5 5.6 5.9 
— 
5.7 5.8 5.5 
— 
3.0 5.6 5.9 
— 
5.7 5.6 5.3 
— 
Northern Interior 1.8 6.5 6.1 
— 
6.1 6.5 6.3 
— 
2.3 6.8 6.6 
— 
6.3 6.9 6.0 
— 
Okanagan 6.2 6.8 6.7 
— 
6.9 6.5 6.6 
— 
5.8 5.6 5.9 
— 
6.2 6.3 6.2 — . • 
South Coast 9.7 4.3 4.5 
— 
4.6 5.3 7.6 
— 
3.8 4.9 5.2 
— 
4.9 5.7 6.0 
— 
Vancouver Island 5.6 6.6 7.0 
— 
6.9 6.4 6.6 
— 
6.0 5.7 6.2 
— 
6.2 6.0 5.8 _ • 
West Kootenay - 2 . 3 7.3 6.5 
— 
6.7 6.2 6.2 
— 
- 1 . 4 6.2 5.5 
— 
6.2 6.1 6.3 
— 
Total Province 5.2 6.4 6.4 
— 
6.5 6.4 6.3 
— 
5.6 6.1 6.1 
— 
6.3 6.3 4.9 
— 
SOURCE: various issues of Summary & Analysis of Teacherf Salary Seules, British Columbia School Trustées* Association. 
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(b) a fairly stable range of about $540 between the highest and the 
lowest salary paid within each minimum and maximum by school 
boards within the lOth and the 90th percentile grouping over the 
past three years (an average range of $485 in 1966, $544 in 1967, 
$531 in 1968 and $553 in 1969), and 
(c) with the exception of the Vancouver Island District (where the 
range was $902), the range of salaries paid for each minimum and 
maximum within each of the ten Districts averaged less than $550 
in 1969. In fact the average range in East Kootenay, Fraser Valley, 
Mainline-Cariboo, and Metropolitan Districts was less than $250. 
Thus the économie significance of the decentralized bargaining structure 
and the maximum impact of local conditions in British Columbia amounts, 
at the most, to an average of about $43 a month on either side of the 
mean for each minimum and maximum qualification level. If the excep-
tionally high and low salaries are ignored, the range of salaries in thèse 
classifications for 80 percent of the school jurisdictions is only about $45 
per month or $23 on either side of the classification average. Thus it 
appears as though local conditions either do not vary significantly though-
out British Columbia or else they do not hâve much of an impact upon 
the level of salaries established. This position is further strengthened since 
the différence in minimum or maximum salaries within each of the ten 
districts in the Province is very low - a variation of less than $20 per 
month (or $10 on either side of the mean salary) within four of thèse 
districts. 
An examination of Table II reveals that the decentralized bargain-
ing structure in Alberta has produced the following, 
(a) a range between the highest and the lowest salaries paid within each 
minimum and maximum category that has fluctuated from year to 
year (an average range of $1,350 in 1966-67, $1,235 in 1967-68, 
$1,727 in 1968-69, and $840 in 1969-70). 
(b) a fairly small and diminishing range of salaries paid for each mi-
nimum and maximum grid classification by school boards in the 
lOth to 90th percentile (an average range of $450 in 1966-67, 
$355 in 1967-68, $346 in 1968-69, and $308 in 1969-70), and 
(c) a fairly small average range of salaries for each minimum and 
maximum grid classifications within any one of the six Zones of 
the province (an average range of $570 in Zone 4 down to $93 
in Zone 1 in 1969-70). 
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As in British Columbia, the Alberta expérience suggests that the économie 
significance of the decentralized bargaining structure has not been sub-
stantial. The maximum impact that local conditions could hâve rnade on 
the level of settlements varied from $144 a month (or $72 on either side 
of the mean for each minimum and maximum) in 1968-69 to oniy $70 
a month (or $35 on either side of the mean) in 1969-70. The variation 
in salaries by those boards within the lOth to 90th percentile grouping 
declined to a low of $25 per month (or $18 on either side of the main 
for each minimum and maximum classification) by 1969-70. It is there-
fore suggested that local conditions hâve not had a significant impact 
upon the level of salaries established throughout Alberta. This position 
is again strengthened by examining the range of salaries within any of the 
six Zones in the province where the range varied between $48 and $8 per 
month (or $24 to $4 per month on either side of the mean for each 
minimum and maximum classification) in 1969-70. 
An examination of Table III reveals that the decentralized bargain-
ing structure in Ontario has produced the following, 
(a) an average provincial range within each minimum and maximum 
position in the public elementary System that has fluctuated between 
$2,775 and $1,400 over the past three years. In this same school 
System the average range in salaries for each minimum and 
maximum category for school boards in the lOth to 90th percentile 
group fluctuated from $1,000 to $538 between 1967-68 to 
1969-70. 
(b) an average provincial range within each minimum and maximum 
position in the elementary separate school system that has fluctuated 
between $1,800 and $1,475 over the past three years. The average 
range in the salary catégories for those elementary separate school 
boards in the lOth to 90th percentile group has fluctuated from 
$975 and $788 between 1967-68 to 1969-70. 
(c ) in combining both the public and the separate elemetary school 
system the provincial range within each minimum and maximum 
category has fluctuated between $2,450 and $1,975 over the three 
year period and the average range for school boards in the lOth 
to 90th percentile group has fluctuated from $1,000 and $550 
between 1967-68 and 1969-70. 
(d) the différence in the level of minimum and maximum salaries 
established in the elementary public school system and in the 
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elementary separate school System has only average $22 in 1967-
68, $10 in 1968-69, and $76 in 1969-70. 
(e) the provincial range between the lowest and the highest salaries 
paid in each of the minimum and maximum catégories in the 
secondary school System fluctuated between $3,225 and $2,413 
over the past four year period and the range in the lOth to 90th 
percentile group averaged from $988 to $675 between 1966-67 
and 1969-70. 
The examination of the fluctuation between the lowest salary and the 
highest salary paid for each minimum and maximum on salary scales in 
Ontario reveals that there is a fairly wide and significant variation in the 
levels of salaries paid throughout Ontario. The examination of school 
boards in the lOth to 90th percentile group reveals that the variation in 
salaries within each minimum and maximum position ranged between 
$83 to $45 per month in the public elementary System, $81 to $66 on the 
separate elementary System and $82 to $56 in the secondary school 
System. Thus one may generalize that local conditions do hâve some 
influence upon the level of salaries paid in Ontario. The other significant 
finding relates to the différence in the level of salaries paid in the ele-
mentary public as compared to the elementary separate school Systems. 
Although thèse two groups are represented by différent teachers' asso-
ciations who negotiate separately with différent school boards, the actual 
salary levels established are virtually identical (an average différence of 
only $22 in 1967-68, $10 in 1968-69, and $76 in 1969-70). 
The results of the foregoing analysis reveal that there is very little 
influence of local conditions upon the level of salaries established in either 
British Columbia or Alberta. One could legitimately question the économie 
value of the decentralized bargaining structure in thèse two provinces. 
The situation in Ontario is somewhat différent. Consolidation of school 
boards only began during the last year of the period examined. Thus in 
the data examined there exists a multitude of very small school juris-
dictions. Under such a situation local conditions do play a rôle in 
determining the level of salaries and the decentralized bargaining system 
has produced some fluctuation in the level of salaries established. 
However, the indications are that with the increased consolidation of 
school boards in Ontario and the increased activities of the teachers' and 
the school trustée associations the impact of this decentralized structure 
in Ontario will be less in the future. 
TABLE III 
MEANS & RANGES ABOUT THE MEANS IN ONTAMO ELEMENTARY SCHOOL SYSTEM FOR MINIMUM & 
MAXIMUM SALARIES PAID 1967-68 - 1969-70 
MINIMUM SALARIES MAXIMUN SALARIES 
Std 1 Std 2 Std 3 Std 4 Std 1 Std 2 Std 3 Std 4 
Public School System 
Provincial Means 
1967-68 4446 4802 5416 5922 6328 7370 8183 9367 
1968-69 4783 5175 5613 6405 6609 7944 8919 10383 
1969-70 5160 5643 6127 7107 7051 8401 9758 11465 
Provincial Ranges 
1967-68 1300 1400 1600 2200 1900 2600 3000 5500 
1968-69 700 700 1200 1900 1000 2000 1700 2000 
1969-70 600 800 1000 1300 1800 1400 1700 5600 
Provincial Ranges Between IOth &. 90th Percentiles 
1967-68 500 500 600 800 900 1200 1400 2100 
1968-69 300 300 400 300 500 600 800 1100 
1969-70 400 600 600 900 700 700 800 1100 
Separate School System 
Provincial Means 
1967-68 4462 4891 5340 5989 6565 7573 8336 9296 
1968-69 4767 5191 5652 6361 6903 7983 8837 10060 
1969-70 5200 5662 6156 6953 7217 8412 9544 10961 
Provincial Ranges 
1967-68 1200 1300 1500 1500 1500 2100 2500 3300 
1968-69 800 800 1000 1200 1200 1500 1900 3400 
1969-70 600 700 1000 1500 2300 1800 1900 2700 
TABLE III (continuée) 
MEANS & RANGES ABOUT THE MEANS IN ONTARIO ELEMENTARY SCHOOL SYSTEM FOR MINIMUM & 
MAXIMUM SALARIES PAID 1967-68 - 1969-70 
MINIMUM SALARIES MAXIMUM SALARIES 
Std 1 Std 2 Std 3 Std 4 Std 1 Std 2 Std 3 Std 4 
Provincial Ranges Between lOth & 90/fc Percentiles 
1967-68 400 500 500 800 800 1200 1400 2200 
1968-69 300 500 500 400 1300 700 900 1700 
1969-70 300 500 600 800 900 600 1100 1600 
Total Elementary School System 
Provincial Means 
1967-68 4448 4815 5214 5932 6363 7399 8205 9357 
1968-69 4778 5180 5625 6392 6696 7955 8895 10286 
1969-70 5225 5651 6138 7062 7110 8416 9667 11317 
Provincial Ranges 
1967-68 1400 1400 1600 2200 1900 2600 3000 5500 
1968-69 1000 1000 1500 2200 1300 2100 2100 3400 
1969-70 600 700 1000 1500 2400 1800 2100 6200 
Provincial Ranges Between lOth & 90th Percentiles 
1967-68 500 500 600 800 900 1100 1500 2100 
1968-69 300 300 400 300 600 600 800 1100 
1969-70 300 500 600 800 700 700 1100 1300 
SOURCE : various issues of Salary Schedules in Ontario Elementary Schools, 
Ontario School Trustées* Council. 
TABLE IV 
MEANS & RANGES ABOUT THE MEANS IN ONTARIO SECONDARY SCHOOL SYSTEM FOR MINIMUM & 
MAXIMUM SALARIES PAID 1967-68 - 1969-70 
MINIMUM SALARIES MAXIMUM SALARIES 
Grp I Grp II Grp III Grp IV Grp I Grp II Grp III Grp IV 
Provincial Means 
1966-67 5448 5768 6419 6830 9083 9475 10561 11083 
1967-68 6055 6583 7373 7532 10201 10718 11966 12759 
1968-69 6605 6960 7748 8239 10762 11318 12687 13471 
1969-70 7107 7416 8237 8761 11465 12042 13454 14377 
Provincial Ranges 
1966-67 1000 1000 1200 1200 3600 3900 4500 5400 
1967-68 1300 1300 1600 1900 2900 2600 3300 4440 
1968-69 1400 1500 1500 2100 6200 2900 3400 7200 
1969-70 1300 1500 1500 1800 5600 5400 4500 3400 
Provincial Ranges Between lOth & 90th Percentiles 
1966-67 500 500 600 600 700 700 800 1000 
1967-68 700 700 600 600 900 1100 1100 1600 
1968-69 700 700 700 700 900 1000 900 1000 
1969-70 900 1000 900 900 1100 1200 Î000 900 
SOURCE: various issues of Salary Schedules in Ontario Secondary Schools, 
Ontario School Trustées' Council. 
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Reasons for Lack of Impact of 
Decentralized Bargaining Structure 
The foregoing examination of minimum and maximum teachers' 
salaries for each level of éducation clearly showed that, despite the 
decentralized bargaining structures, the inter-jurisdictional variations in 
the level of teachers' salaries within thèse provinces is generally quite 
small. Thus there is fairly strong évidence to suggest that local conditions 
play a relatively minor rôle in determining the level of teachers' salaries 
even under a decentralized bargaining System. It is also felt that the 
impact of thèse local conditions will become even less in the future. 
There are basically five factors leading to the intra-provincial similarity 
of teachers' salaries even under a decentralized bargaining system. One 
may be classified as financial, one as labour market and the others as 
institutional in nature. A discussion of thèse factors follows : 
FINANCIAL FACTOR 
Educational finance is a shared municipal-provincial responsability 
in ail three provinces. A foundation or cost sharing formula has been 
developed in each province to détermine the share arrangements between 
the two levels of government. Under thèse arrangements the provincial 
governments hâve slowly been assuming a larger portion of the educa-
tional financial burden. Thèse cost sharing programs hâve established a 
minimum or standard level of éducation services (including instructional 
services) for ail school jurisdictions in the province. They hâve also 
guaranteed that, regardless of the tax base, ail school jurisdictions are 
able to provide at least thèse minimum services. The involvement of the 
provincial governments in the financing of public éducation has leveled 
out many of the abilky-to-pay inequities that had previously existed 
between school jurisdictions. The removal of thèse ability-to-pay inequities 
has in turn led to a narrowing of the intra-provincial différences in 
teachers' salary levels and a removal of much of the impact of local 
conditions. 
LABOUR MARKET FACTOR 
The major labour market factor influencing the level of teachers' 
salaries within a province has been the shortage of teachers. The teacher 
labour market is primarily provincial in scope and any shortage of teachers 
is felt fairly consistently throughout a single province. School trustées are 
aware of the relationship between the level of their teachers' salaries, 
relative to salaries in other school jurisdictions, and their supply and 
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turnover of teachers. School boards are therefore compelled by the labour 
market compétitive pressures to pay salaries which are at, or at least 
close, to the average level of salaries paid in the province. Yet at the 
same time the financial burden and the pressures of the taxpayers impose 
an upper limit on the salaries they are able to offer. The resuit is that the 
standard déviation about the mean level of salaries between jurisdictions 
diminishes as the salary levels of ail school boards tend toward the 
provincial average. Thus the reaction of the school trustées to the teacher 
shortage results in a narrowing of the intra-provincial différences in 
teacher salary levels and a further removal of the influence of local 
conditions. 
ÏNSTITUTIONAL FACTORS 
The three most significant institutional factors leading to the de-
emphasizing of local conditions in the salary structures are as follows : 
The Rôle of the Provincial Associations — In each of thèse three 
provinces salaries were originally determined at the local level between 
représentatives of the local teachers and the school board. Over a period 
of time the salary détermination procédure has become more and more 
sophisticated and, as a resuit, the provincial teachers' and trustées' asso-
ciations hâve been taking more and more of an active rôle in the déter-
mination of teachers' salaries. With each stage of association involvement 
came more emphasis upon comparability and a greater consistency in the 
salary levels established within a province. Speaking generally thèse 
provinces hâve gone through the following stages of development (a) 
pure and simple local negotiations, (b) local negotiations with statistics 
and comparisons supplied by the provincial associations, (c) local 
negotiations with the provincial associations holding régional or provincial 
negotiations « strategy » meeting, and (d) local negotiations with the 
provincial associations becoming involved in ail disputes which go to the 
conciliation and/or arbitration stage. The associations in British Colombia 
and Alberta are now entering a fifth stage wherein the professional 
negotiators of the provincial associations are starting to personally assist 
and advise the local negotiators and in some instances actually participat-
ing in local negotiations. With each of thèse steps cornes a natural tendency 
to overlook and reduce the impact of local conditions. 
Rôle of Third Parties - Third parties play a much stronger rôle in 
collective bargaining in the public sector than they do in the private 
seotor. There is no area in the public sector where the impact of thèse 
third parties has been as great as in the éducation field. The reasons for 
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this are threefold. First, with éducation being a very sensitive area, most 
government officiais are extremely anxious to avoid a «situation» in 
éducation. Second, since some school trustées are elected every year, 
collective bargaining, the level of teachers' salaries and school taxes tend 
to become an élection issue each and every year. Therefore many trustées 
welcome the chance to hand over this problem and possibly shift the 
responsability to a third party. Finally, a crisis in éducation personally 
involves almost every family in the school jurisdiction. This to many 
becomes a moralistic issue of denying the children their educational rights 
while to others it simply créâtes the problem of providing supervision and 
babysitting for the children at home. In both instances the resuit is 
intensive pressure from the parents upon the trustées, the teachers and 
the government. This parental pressure is usually enough to trigger the 
intervention of a third party or third part/es. 
Both teachers and trustées sincerely wish to avoid the pressure 
created by the involvement of thèse third parties. Thus the pressures, 
or threat of pressures, from thèse groups becomes an added « cost of 
disagreement » taken into considération by the negotiators. The outcome 
is that both teachers and trustées become more reluctant to retain fixed 
negotiation positions. This tends to reduce the range within which settle-
ments are reached within the province, which in turn reduces the range 
of salary settlements. 
Rôle of the Negotiation Procédure - The negotiation procédure 
followed by teachers and trustées also tends to place less emphasis upon 
the impact of local conditions upon the salary settlements. An indication 
of the impact of the negotiation procédure is shown in the following two 
examples. 
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION 
The compulsory arbitration requirement in British Columbia defi-
nitely weakens the influence of local conditions and narrows the range 
of différences in intra-provincial salary levels. A study of the impact of 
arbitration in British Columbia clearly revealed that the arbitration awards 
tend to centre around the average level of negotiated settlements. As the 
Director of Economie Welfare for the British Columbia Teachers' 
Fédération stated, our gênerai consensus is that arbitration awards permit 
us to obtain the going rate of increase which has to be previously 
established by negotiations3. 
3 Letter from Mr. Des Grady, Director, Economie Welfare, British Columbia 
Teachers' Fédération dated June 12th, 1969. 
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This consensus is further supported by the fact that in the 1969 
negotiations, the average increase was 6.3% (55 settlements) as compared 
to only 6.1% average increase granted by arbitrators (30 awards) 4 . 
Since most arbitrators appear to use the level of negotiated settlements 
as their guide, the arbitration procédure tends to reduce the intra-
provincial variations in teacher salary levels and ignores local conditions. 
MULTI-LEVEL BARGAINING STAGE 
In Alberta there is an effective five-stage negotiation procédure 
used by the teachers and trustées. This procédure has the effect of applying 
maximum pressure upon the parties and also providing thern with 
maximum opportunity for flexibility. Each successive stage applies more 
pressure on the parties and tends to lubricate any sticky positions assumed 
by thern. Again this tends to narrow what otherwise might be wide 
variations in teacher salary levels. An indication of this tendency is gained 
by examining the average salary grid increases between the years 1967-
68 and 1968-69 for the 22 Albertan school districts which settled, at the 
conciliation commissioner stage or beyond5. The average increase for 
the six groups which settled at the conciliation commissioner stage was 
4.86 percent as compared to an average of 5.50 percent for the nine 
groups which settled at the conciliation board stage and the 5.02 percent 
for the seven groups which went beyond the conciliation board. The actual 
increase recommended by the conciliation board over the conciliation 
commissioner averaged only 0.58 percent. Similarly the settlements which 
went beyond the conciliation board stage settled at only an average of 
0.16 percent higher than the conciliation board's award. Thus the 
influence of thèse successive steps tends to reduce the influence of local 
conditions and narrow the range in salary settlements in a province. 
Direction of Décentraiîzed Bargaining Structures 
The foregoing analysis is inadéquate to enable broad conclusions to 
be drawn. However, the évidence produced is strong enough to suggest 
that either local conditions do not vary significantly within the three 
provinces (particularly British Columbia and Alberta) or else local 
différences hâve a very weak influence upon the level of salaries establish-
ed. Recognizing that local conditions do exist in each of the three 
4 1969 Report of the Agreements Committee, report given to the 1969 Animal 
General Meeting of the British Columbia Teachers' Fédération, p. 44. 
5 Unpublished material provided by L.G. Young, Head, Economie Services 
Alberta School Trustées' Association, May 23rd, 1969. 
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provinces it may be concluded that, generally speaking, the decentralized 
bargaining structure no longer takes strong account of the impact of local 
conditions. As suggested, the impact of various financial, labour market 
and institutional factors hâve overshadowed and dominated the influence 
of local conditions. Thus, from an économie standpoint, it appears hardly 
worth the time, effort or cost involved for teachers and trustées to go 
through the collective bargaining ritual each year at the local level. The 
question is therefore raised regarding the justification for about 75 
différent sets of negotiations to be conducted in British Columbia and in 
Alberta and for about 175 différent sets of negotiations to be conducted 
in Ontario when the end results are so similar - this study suggests that 
justification cannot be found in the argument that the decentralized bar-
gaining structure recognizes local conditions. Such justification may be 
found in the other arguments relating to communication, teachers-trustee 
relations, involvement of local personnel in the décision making process, 
but it is not to be found in an economy argument. 
Thus in the éducation field there are two forces presently exerting 
pressure upon the industrial relations Systems. One force results from the 
rapid increase in educational costs and the pressure being developed by 
ratepayers to shift much of this burden to provincial governments who 
now hâve little control over the level of thèse expenditures. The second 
pressure in the System results from the narrowing of the intra-provincial 
différences in the level of teachers' salaries. As indicated, this means that 
local conditions play a relatively minor rôle in the détermination of 
teachers' salaries and therefore weakens the justification for locally 
determined salaries. The obvious results are twofold. First, a greater 
financial responsibility for éducation is shifting to the provincial govern-
ments. This in turn will lead to greater government involvement in 
teacher salary détermination. Naturally « he who pays the piper will want 
to control the cost of the tune » . Second, there is and will be a greater 
move toward « area » or province-wide bargaining. 
The récent government activities in Québec, New Brunswick and 
Saskatchewan are obvious indications of such a trend. However, the re-
organization of Ontario schools into larger school units resulting from 
Bill 44 and 45 may lead to an accélération of this trend in Ontario. 
Similarly the « negotiations » between the Government, the teachers' 
Union and the Trustées' Associations over the Grant Scale in Nova 
Scotia and the emphasis that is being placed upon this scale may lead to 
greater détermination of salaries at the provincial level in that province. 
In addition, the trustées and the teachers in Alberta appear to be 
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organizing for salary négociations on a zone basis more then ever before. 
The similarity of salaries within thèse zones and the activities of thèse 
zone bargaining committees could lead to an extension of this trend in 
Alberta. Also, the Alberta Government's récent 6 percent budget increase 
limitation also suggests more government influence in salary détermination 
in Alberta than ever before. Finally, in British Columbia the Government's 
récent financial Bill requiring ail school board budgets to be approved by 
the Government could lead to greater government involvement in salary 
détermination (such a requirement was also proposed by the Manitoba 
Government). Therefore, I feel that the handwriting is on the wall 
and there is a definite trend towards greater centralization of the déter-
mination of teachers' salary in ail provinces and that the provincial 
governments will become more and more involved in the actual salary 
détermination process in ail provinces. 
PROBLÈMES ET TENDANCES DE LA NÉGOCIATION 
COLLECTIVE DÉCENTRALISÉE DANS LES SYSTÈMES 
D'ÉDUCATION PUBLIQUE DE L'ONTARIO ET DES 
PROVINCES DE L'OUEST 
Le problème de la négociation collective pour les enseignants au Canada est 
généralement résolu. Il reste cependant deux ombres au tableau : la question de 
droit et la question de structure. Le premier problème réfère à l'usage de la grève 
et/ou d'autres moyens alors que le second soulève la question du niveau approprié 
pour les négociations collectives (locales, régionales, etc). Ce problème de structure 
inclut évidemment la question du degré de centralisation qui devrait exister en 
négociation collective. Cet article examine la structure de la négociation chez les 
enseignants et s'attarde sur les problèmes et les tendances de la négociation décen-
tralisée en Colombie Britannique, en Alberta et en Ontario. 
LE DÉVELOPPEMENT DES STRUCTURES DÉCENTRALISÉES DE NÉGOCIATION 
La raison expliquant l'existence de structures décentralisées est fondamenta-
lement historique : dès les débuts, on retrouve le pouvoir au niveau local. Cependant, 
avec le temps, on remarque une divergence croissante de vue entre les côtés patronal 
et syndical quant à cette décentralisation. L'argument majeur de cette divergence 
provient de la préoccupation suivante : est-ce que la négociation décentralisée prend 
les conditions locales en considération? Le côté patronal prétend que non, alors 
que le côté syndical répond affirmativement à cette question. Sous un tel système 
de négociation, on peut faire l'hypothèse que si les conditions locales varient entre 
juridictions scolaires et si ces conditions locales jouent un rôle important dans le 
processus de négociation, il y aura alors une grande disparité entre les structures de 
salaires établies par les différentes juridictions scolaires à travers une province. 
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L'étude que nous avons faite révèle qu'il n'y a qu'une très faible influence des 
conditions locales sur les niveaux de salaires en Colombie Britannique et en Alberta. 
Nous retrouvons cependant l'inverse en Ontario, mais l'intégration des commissions 
scolaires rendra vite le cas ontarien semblable à celui des deux provinces de l'Ouest. 
La similarité intraprovinciale des salaires des enseignants même sous un système 
de négociation collective décentralisée trouve son explication dans cinq facteurs 
principaux : le facteur financier (participation des gouvernements provinciaux), le 
marché du travail (par son caractère concurrentiel), le rôle croissant des associations 
provinciales d'enseignants, le rôle des tierces parties en négociation collective et le 
rôle de la procédure de négociation. 
LES TENDANCES DES STRUCTURES DÉCENTRALISÉES 
Nous pouvons conclure de façon générale que la structure décentralisée de 
négociation ne considère plus autant l'impact des conditions locales. Il apparaît 
donc rentable de négocier chaque année au niveau local. On arrive cependant à se 
demander s'il existe une justification pour la tenue d'un grand nombre de négocia-
tions dont les résultats sont tellement similaires. On trouve justification en consi-
dérant la communication et les relations entre enseigants et leurs commissions 
scolaires et la participation locale à la prise de décisions. Cependant il n'existe pas 
de justification économique. 
LE SYNDICALISME CANADIEN (1968) 
une réévaluation 
Introduction, Gérard Dion — Les objectifs syndicaux traditionnels et la société 
nouvelle (Jean-Réal Cardin — Gérard Picard — Louis Laberge — Jean Bru-
nelle). Les structures syndicales et objectifs syndicaux (Stuart Jamieson — 
Philippe Vaillancourt — Roland Martel). La démocratie syndicale (Gérard 
Dion — Adrien Plourde). Les rivalités syndicales : force ou faiblesse (Evelyne 
Dumas — Gérard Rancourt — Raymond Parent). Le syndicalisme et les tra-
vailleurs non-syndiqués (Léo Roback — Jean-Gérin-Lajoie — F.-X. Légaré). 
L'extension de la formule syndicale à des secteurs non-traditionnels (Shirley B. 
Goldenberg — André Thibaudeau — Raymond-G. Laliberté — Jean-Paul 
Brassard). Le syndicalisme et la participation aux décisions économiques 
(Bernard Solasse — Jacques Archambault — Fernand Daoust — Charles 
Perreault). Les syndicats et l'action politique (Vincent Lemieux — Marcel 
Pépin — Laurent Châteauneuf et William Dodge). Le syndicalisme, la société 
nouvelle et la pauvreté (Hon. Maurice Lamontagne). Bilan et horizons. 
Annexes : Le syndicalisme au Canada ; la Concurrence syndicale dans le 
Québec (Gérard Dion). 
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